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Graeme Baxter and Rita Marcella
Do Online Election Campaigns Sway the Vote? 
A Study of the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary Election
DE GRUYTER
Abstract: This paper reports the results of a study which in-
vestigated the use of social media by political parties and 
candidates in Scotland as part of their campaign for elec-
tion to the Scottish Parliament in 2011, and which com-
pared this to the situation encountered during the 2010 UK 
General Election campaign. During the five-week period 
preceding the election date of May 5, 2011, the content of 
203 Facebook pages, 152 Twitter accounts, and 66 blogs was 
analysed in order to identify the ways in which political ac-
tors provided information to, and interacted with, potential 
voters. The study found that social media, as in 2010, were 
used primarily for the one-way flow of information to the 
electorate. There was little direct, two-way engagement, 
and a general reluctance to respond to difficult policy ques-
tions or critical comments posted by the public. The infor-
mation provided also frequently lacked any meaningful 
policy comment. Although the average number of friends 
and followers of politicians’ social media sites had risen 
since 2010, there was evidence to suggest that the gener-
al public was less interested in engaging with these sites, 
by posting comments or entering into any online debates. 
The paper questions the assertion of the victorious party, 
the Scottish National Party, that the 2011 Scottish election 
was the “first European election where online has swayed 
the vote,” and concludes by considering what implications 
these patterns of information provision and communica-
tion might have for those candidates who were successfully 
elected to the Scottish Parliament.
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Introduction and Background
The 2010 UK General Election was a disappointing one for 
the Scottish National Party (SNP), which won only six of 
the 59 constituency seats in Scotland (far short of its tar-
get of 20) and achieved just a 19.9% share of the Scottish 
vote. Just 12 months later, though, the SNP swept to power 
in the 2011 Scottish Parliament election, winning 69 of the 
129 available seats with a 45.4% share of the constituency 
votes and a 44% share of the regional vote, thus becoming 
the first ever Scottish administration with a clear working 
majority. As The Scotsman newspaper pointed out, this was 
“an achievement unprecedented in modern Scottish poli-
tics” (The Scotsman 2011), for the Scottish Parliament elec-
toral system had been designed specifically to prevent one 
party winning an outright majority, with its proportional, 
regional votes approach intended to balance out any gains 
made from the first-past-the-post constituency seats.
In the aftermath of its victory, the SNP highlighted the 
crucial role played by its digital campaign, which included 
the use of a bespoke voter database called Activate, and a 
new platform, NationBuilder, which integrated Facebook 
and Twitter with the party’s snp.org website. Prospective 
parliamentary candidates (including existing Scottish 
Government Cabinet Secretaries) and party activists were 
encouraged to use these tools to identify, contact, and in-
teract with potential voters online, and combine this with 
more traditional face-to-face electioneering work on the 
street and on the doorstep. The party also encouraged 
its online candidates and activists to adopt an optimis-
tic, positive tone throughout, in contrast to the perceived 
negative campaigning approaches of its opponents. Con-
sequently, the SNP claimed that the 2011 Scottish Parlia-
ment campaign was the “first European election where 
online has swayed the vote” (Gordon 2011), and that its 
digital strategy would now be the “model for political par-
ties all over the world” (Wade 2011).
Looking beyond this rhetoric, was the public face of 
the SNP’s online campaign in 2011 – particularly on social 
media – really that different from, and more influential 
than, the party’s efforts just twelve months earlier? After 
all, a study conducted by the current authors had revealed 
that the SNP, and other political actors in Scotland, had 
tended to use social media in rather bland and superficial 
ways during the 2010 General Election campaign (Baxter 
and Marcella 2012). Blogs, Facebook, and Twitter were 
used primarily for the one-way flow of information from 
parties and candidates to the electorate: there was little 
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two-way engagement with potential voters, and a general 
reluctance to respond to policy questions or critical com-
ments. The information provided was frequently lacking 
in meaningful policy commentary, and the friends and fol-
lowers on the sites appeared to be largely family, friends 
and personal acquaintances of the candidates, or party 
members or activists. Did the 2011 campaign really see 
such a seismic shift in the extent and nature of politicians’ 
social media use that might truly have affected the wider 
Scottish public’s democratic choice? 
If the SNP’s assertions are to be believed, then they 
are also at odds with the views of those commentators 
who claim that the Internet is unlikely to ever be a truly 
revolutionary campaign tool in the UK. As Ward and Vedel 
(2006) observe, in discussing the growing body of inter-
national literature on the political impact of the Internet, 
the early contributions, from the mid- to late-1990s, her-
alded a general wave of enthusiasm from “mobilisation” 
or “equalisation” theorists who predicted that the Internet 
would facilitate a more participatory style of politics, draw-
ing more people into the democratic process and bringing 
politicians and the electorate closer together. This was fol-
lowed closely by a second wave of more sceptical voices: 
“reinforcement” or “normalisation” theorists who argued 
that the Internet simply reflected and reinforced existing 
patterns of offline political behaviour. Although renewed 
optimism has emerged more recently, particularly as a re-
sult of Barack Obama’s effective use of new Web 2.0 tech-
nologies in his US presidential campaigns (e.g. Cogburn 
and Espinoza-Vasquez 2011), some observers believe that 
such success could never be replicated in Britain. For ex-
ample, following the 2010 UK General Election, which had 
been predicted by many observers to be one on which so-
cial media would have a significant impact (e.g. Swaine 
2010), Williamson (2010a) concluded that “it is time to 
put aside the idea of an ‘internet election’.” He argued 
that, although digital media can play an increasingly im-
portant role in UK elections, particularly as management 
tools with which parties organise and coordinate their 
candidates and activists, the party-centred nature of Brit-
ish politics does not really lend itself to online campaigns 
that capture the imagination of the general public. He 
contrasts this with the campaign culture in the US, where 
the more personality-led approach provides a powerful 
means of mobilising public support and raising campaign 
funds online (Williamson 2010b).
With these points in mind, this paper reports the re-
sults of a study which examined the use of social media by 
political parties and individual candidates during the 2011 
Scottish Parliament election campaign. More specifically, 
it aimed to:
 – measure the extent of the adoption and use of social 
media by parties and candidates during the cam-
paign, and compare this with the situation encoun-
tered during the 2010 UK General Election;
 – analyse the nature of the information provision and 
exchange that took place on these sites, again com-
paring this with the 2010 campaign;
 – investigate those individual candidates who stood 
in both campaigns, to establish if election failure in 
2010 had had any obvious impact on their adoption 
and use of social media during the 2011 contest; and
 – explore the SNP’s claims that its digital campaign had 
played a significant role in the party’s election suc-
cess. 
This research formed part of an ongoing series of inves-
tigations by the authors examining the use of the Inter-
net by political actors during parliamentary elections in 
Scotland. It also complemented a user information behav-
iour study conducted during the 2011 Scottish Parliament 
campaign, where 64 citizens of Aberdeen, in North-east 
Scotland, were observed and questioned as they searched 
for, browsed, and used information on the websites and 
social media sites of parties and candidates (Baxter et al. 
2013). That associated user study will also be discussed 
throughout this paper.
Methodology
In order to enable a meaningful comparison, the research 
was conducted along lines identical to those in the au-
thors’ 2010 campaign study. It consisted of two elements, 
the major one being an analysis of the content of the social 
media sites belonging to the parties and candidates stand-
ing in the 73 constituency and 56 regional seats in the 2011 
Scottish Parliament election. It focused on those social me-
dia – blogs, Facebook, and Twitter – with largely textual 
content, rather than on photo or video sharing sites such 
as Flickr and YouTube. The content analysis covered the 
five-week period preceding the polling date of May 5, 2011.
As had been the case during the 2010 election, the po-
litical parties’ websites generally provided prominent, di-
rect links to their social media sites, where these existed. 
From these, it was established that half (12 of 23) of the 
competing parties had either a Facebook or Twitter pres-
ence, with six operating both types of media. This repre-
sented a slight increase in uptake from the 2010 election, 
when 7 of the 20 parties were using Facebook or Twitter. 
The parties using social media ranged from the four major 
ones that have traditionally dominated the Scottish politi-
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cal arena (SNP, Labour, Liberal Democrat, and Conserva-
tive), to the minority/fringe parties, some of which had a 
very narrow policy agenda (e.g., the ‘Ban Bankers’ Bonus-
es’ party). Unsurprisingly, then, the number of Facebook 
friends or Twitter followers each party had attracted by the 
2011 polling day varied dramatically, from the 15 individu-
als following the All Scotland Pensioners Party’s Twitter 
account to the 10,433 who ‘liked’ the SNP’s Facebook site. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, most of the social media sites of the 
major parties had seen a twofold or threefold increase in 
friends, likers or followers since the 2010 campaign. Fig-
ure 1 also shows that the Labour Party continued to be the 
only major party without a Facebook presence.
In terms of the number of posts made by the parties 
during the five-week campaign period, these also varied 
widely. On Twitter, for example, the All Scotland Pension-
ers Party failed to tweet at all, while the SNP sent out al-
most 500 messages. On Facebook, meanwhile, the Scot-
tish Green Party was the most prolific user, posting 264 
messages on its wall. Where direct comparisons could be 
made between the 2010 and 2011 elections, it was found 
that most parties had increased their social media activ-
ity; the one exception was the Conservative Party, which 
effectively halved its Twitter posts during the 2011 cam-
paign.
As was also the case in the 2010 campaign, the parties’ 
websites in 2011 were not particularly helpful in directing 
users to the social media sites of their individual candi-
dates. To identify such sites, the researchers therefore had 
to rely on Google searches1, on using the Facebook and 
Twitter search engines, and on systematically examining 
the lists of friends or followers on the parties’ social media 
sites. On completing these searches, it was found that 259 
(34.3%) of the 756 candidates2 were using at least one of 
the three types of application; a slight drop proportion-
ately from that encountered during the 2010 campaign, 
when 36.9% (128) of the 347 candidates had a social media 
presence. There was, however, a significant difference in 
the extent to which constituency and regional candidates 
had adopted social media in 2011. Almost half (48.9%) of 
the 321 constituency candidates were using such media, 
compared with less than a quarter (23.4%) of the 435 can-
didates (largely from the smaller political parties) who ap-
peared only on the regional lists. These differences were 
1 Interestingly, rather than making any efforts to provide direct links 
to the social media sites of its individual candidates, the SNP advised 
users to use Google. A post on the party’s Facebook site (at www.fa-
cebook.com/theSNP) on April 25, 2011 suggested that “you can have 
a direct conversation with the entire SNP Cabinet on Twitter, as well 
as the entire campaign team”, noting that, to find them, you should 
“just Google their name and “Twitter”, and they should pop up”.
2 In Scottish Parliament elections, candidates can stand in individ-
ual constituencies and/or wider regional lists. Parties can nominate 
up to 12 candidates in each of the eight electoral regions. In the 2011 
campaign, there were 147 constituency-only candidates, 174 individ-
uals who appeared in both constituency and regional lists, and 435 
region-only candidates; a total of 756 contestants.
Figure 1: Number of friends and followers on parties’ social media sites: comparison of 2010 and 2011 campaigns
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perhaps unsurprising, for, to put it bluntly, most regional 
list candidates from the smaller parties were effectively 
making up the numbers and had little or no chance of 
electoral success. As had been the situation with UK Mem-
bers of Parliament (MPs) during the 2010 contest, existing 
Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) seeking re-
election were significantly more likely (p<0.05) to be using 
social media during the 2011 campaign than those candi-
dates with little or no parliamentary experience.
Facebook was the most popular application in 2011, 
used by 25.8% of candidates (37.7% of constituency can-
didates), while 18.8% (28.3% of constituency candidates) 
operated a Twitter account, and 8.7% (13.7% of constitu-
ency candidates) maintained a personal blog. This sug-
gests a slight shift towards the use of Facebook as the 
preferred social media electioneering tool, for, during the 
2010 campaign, Facebook and Twitter had been used by 
almost identical proportions of candidates (21.0% and 
21.9%, respectively). 
Figure 2 compares the adoption of the three types of 
social media by the various parties’ constituency candi-
dates during the two campaigns. As can be seen, while the 
Liberal Democrat candidates had appeared the most will-
ing to adopt social media (particularly Twitter) in 2010, by 
2011 the SNP had the greatest online presence, with 65.8% 
of its constituency candidates using Facebook, and 41.1% 
having a Twitter account. The Labour candidates, mean-
while, appeared to be the most enthusiastic bloggers in 
2011, with just over one-fifth (21.9%) of their constituency 
candidates having a personal blog. As had been the case in 
2010, the most reluctant adopters of social media amongst 
the major parties were the Conservative candidates, with 
one-quarter (24.7%) using Twitter and just 12.3% having a 
Facebook page. Indeed, the report of a post-2010 election 
commission established by the Scottish Conservatives 
had noted “a widespread acceptance across the Party that 
the advantages of electronic communications and ‘new 
media’ are not being utilised in campaigning, commu-
nications and the Party’s operations overall” (Scottish 
Conservatives 2010 Commission 2010, 35). Despite this, it 
would appear that little change had occurred within the 
party in the intervening 12 months. 
The number of friends and followers each candidate 
had attracted in 2011 varied considerably. On Facebook, 
one Green Party hopeful had only three friends by poll-
ing day, while the prominent UK Independence Party 
Figure 2: Constituency candidates’ adoption of social media: comparison of 2010 and 2011 campaigns
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candidate, Lord Christopher Monckton, had almost 6,300. 
Similarly, the number of Twitter followers ranged from the 
two people following another Green Party candidate, to 
the near 27,000 following the controversial Respect Party 
politician, George Galloway. Back in 2010, the Labour and 
Liberal Democrat candidates had, on average, attained a 
larger social media following than those from the other 
major parties. However, 2011 saw the average followings of 
Labour and Liberal Democrat candidates fall, while those 
of Conservative candidates showed a slight increase, and 
those of SNP contestants rose significantly. This general 
pattern is illustrated in Figure 3, which compares the me-
dian number of candidates’ Twitter followers, by party, at 
the conclusion of the two campaigns.
In line with the 2010 campaign, the number of social 
media posts made by candidates in 2011 also varied dra-
matically. At one end of the extreme, one Conservative 
candidate sent 1,449 tweets over the five-week campaign 
period. In sharp contrast, exactly one-third of the 66 can-
didates with a blog failed to make any posts during the 
campaign, while no activity took place on 18 of the can-
didate Facebook sites and in 15 of the Twitter accounts. 
These inactive candidates came from across all competing 
parties. Overall, when compared with the 2010 study, the 
average number of Facebook campaign wall posts made 
by each candidate in 2011 had risen slightly, from 20 to 
27; while the average number of candidate tweets had in-
creased from 81 to 99. The average number of blog posts 
per candidate remained virtually the same (seven in 2010, 
six in 2011).
In the current authors’ associated user information 
behaviour study, it is fair to say that voters were bemused 
by those candidates’ social media sites in which the con-
tent remained static throughout the crucial campaign pe-
riod. As one participant asked succinctly, “Why have it?” 
Indeed, it is possible that the number of inactive candi-
dates on Facebook may have been even greater during the 
2011 campaign, for a significant proportion (64; 32.8%) 
of the 195 contestants with a Facebook presence (again 
from across all parties) had made their walls private, 
accessible only to confirmed friends of the candidates. 
Twelve months earlier, just three of the 73 candidates 
on Facebook had made use of such privacy settings. This, 
the current authors believe, indicates a disappointing 
trend, where only those voters already known to the can-
didates, or who are willing to publicly display their alle-
giance to the candidates and their parties by becoming a 
friend, can gain access to any political or policy information 
or comment made by their potential elected representa- 
tives. 
In 2011, two of the 142 candidates on Twitter had also 
protected their Tweets, rendering them inaccessible to un-
approved followers. Interestingly, one of these individu-
als, a Conservative candidate who had stood unsuccess-
fully in two previous parliamentary elections, appeared 
not to have learned any lessons from the online faux pas 
of other political figures, for, just a few months earlier, he 
created considerable controversy when he used his Twit-
ter account to make some ill-judged remarks about carers 
(Whitaker 2010). Consequently, any political utterings he 
made during the campaign period would have been read 
by only a few dozen approved confidants, rather than the 
wider Scottish electorate ― hardly an approach likely to 
garner additional votes.
Figure 3: Median number of candidates’ Twitter followers, by party: comparison of 2010 and 2011 
campaigns
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Excluding the private walls, protected tweets, and 
dormant sites, the content of 134 Twitter accounts, 120 
Facebook pages, and 44 blogs, from the five weeks preced-
ing the polling date of May 5, 2011, was captured electroni-
cally for subsequent analysis. While the number of online 
sites and packages designed to archive and analyse social 
media traffic continues to grow (e.g., Tweetdoc at www.
tweetdoc.org, and Tweet Archivist at www.tweetarchivist.
com), none has yet been found that meets the specific 
needs of this type of research. With this in mind, the sim-
ple copy-and-paste approach from the 2010 study (Baxter 
and Marcella 2012) was used again, where all posts (blog 
entries, tweets, and Facebook wall posts) were copied and 
pasted into MS Word documents, read systematically, and 
then coded based on the main thrust of their content. The 
coded content was then enumerated manually on coding 
sheets, using the five-bar gate method, and the resultant 
data input to, and analysed in, SPSS for Windows. The 
main results of these analyses will be discussed in the sec-
tions that follow.
The total number of posts captured and analysed 
in 2011 (over 23,000) was double that in the 2010 study 
(11,700), largely because of the far greater number of indi-
vidual candidates who participate in Scottish Parliamen-
tary elections than in UK General Elections. This meant, 
of course, that the comprehensive, largely manual meth-
od employed was twice as time-consuming as in the 2010 
campaign. If this study is replicated during future Scottish 
Parliamentary elections, then the analysis of a represent-
ative sample of candidate sites might be more appropri-
ate and manageable, particularly if social media become 
adopted more widely by campaign contestants.
The second, more minor element of the 2011 study in-
volved a series of questions, on campaign and policy is-
sues, directed at the social media sites of individual candi-
dates. In making these enquiries, the research team sought 
to measure the speed at which candidates responded, as 
well as any efforts made to create an ongoing relationship 
with potential voters. Here, an element of covert research 
was used, where the researchers, although using their 
real names, created special Twitter accounts and modified 
an existing personal Facebook site, to conceal their geo-
graphic location (and, therefore, their parliamentary con-
stituency) and to disguise the fact that they were academic 
researchers. This was done to ensure that the candidates’ 
behaviour remained normal and consistent, in terms of re-
sponding to questions from the electorate. A similar exer-
cise during the 2010 campaign study had met with mixed 
results: four of eight questions sent by Facebook were 
answered, while all 30 enquiries sent using Twitter were 
ignored completely. In 2011, one question, on the issues 
being raised by voters on the doorstep, was sent to 20 can-
didates on Twitter, with six (30%) responding. Efforts to 
send questions using Facebook, though, were hampered 
by the fact that half (97) of the 195 candidate Facebook 
sites did not permit visitors to send a direct message to the 
candidate without first joining or liking the site. In addi-
tion, after successfully sending a question (on public con-
fusion over the alternative vote process3) to 51 candidates, 
the researchers found themselves suspended by Facebook 
for “engaging in behaviour that may be considered annoy-
ing or abusive by other users”. Nevertheless, the research 
team received replies from 18 (35%) of the 51 candidates, 
and their responses, plus those to the Twitter enquiries, 
will be discussed further below.
Content Analysis of Party and 
Candidate Social Media Sites
Candidate Twitter Accounts
The 140 candidates with unprotected Twitter accounts 
sent a total of 13,900 tweets during the five-week campaign 
period. As Figure 4 illustrates, almost one-third (31.6%) of 
these posts saw the candidates in what the current au-
thors describe as Primary Broadcast mode, where they 
provided their followers with their personal thoughts and 
comments on a wide range of issues, from world events, 
such as the death of Osama Bin Laden, to local press cov-
erage of the election campaign. The largest proportion of 
these Primary Broadcast tweets (comprising 11.3% of the 
total posts) related to the candidates’ personal campaign 
activities; where, for example, they discussed their experi-
ences on voters’ doorsteps or at hustings events, or where 
they highlighted their media appearances. As had been 
the case in the 2010 election, these posts were almost uni-
versally (and unrealistically) positive and optimistic: even 
those candidates who were resoundingly defeated on poll-
ing day had claimed throughout the campaign that the 
electorate was warmly responsive to their political mes-
sage. A very small number of candidates did, however, in-
troduce an element of self-irony in these posts:
Good door knocking session in Kincorth tonight. (But would you 
ever expect a candidate to tweet about a bad session?)
3 On the day of the Scottish Parliament election, May 5, 2011, a UK-
wide Alternative Vote referendum was also taking place, on whether 
or not to change the method of electing MPs to the UK Parliament.
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Really good eve-of-poll response on the doors tonight. I know 
candidates never say anything but that. CS&R [the constituency 
of Caithness, Sutherland & Ross] looking like being interesting.
As was the case in 2010, there was a real reluctance 
amongst the 2011 candidates to reveal what issues were 
being raised by the electorate during these encounters. 
Just 0.4% of the overall tweets (a drop from 0.7% in 2010) 
were devoted to local issues of prime concern to their po-
tential constituents, such as transport services or the clo-
sure of recreational facilities. Similarly, only 2.1% of posts 
(a slight increase from 1.6% in 2010) provided personal 
comment on national policy matters, such as education 
and health: 
“Out campaigning in #stmargaretshope this morning and now 
in #Kirkwall - great discussions on #ferries and #underfunding” 
(Conservative candidate)
“Kinning Park community is still angry about the council 
closing their community hall. “That hall was ours!” Strong case 
for the common good.” (Green candidate)
“Visiting the day centre in East Linton, the users were very clear 
there needed to be ‘joined up thinking’ between health and 
social care” (Liberal Democrat candidate)
In fact, in 2011, candidates were almost twice as likely 
(4.2% of the overall traffic) to send tweets relating to their 
home life and domestic activities, or to non-political mat-
ters such as science fiction television series or the latest 
sports results. In the associated user study, participants 
were critical of this lack of policy information, particular-
ly on local issues, noting also that pertinent policy com-
ment can get lost amidst the candidates’ more personal 
posts.
Participants in the user study were also less than im-
pressed with examples of negative campaigning, where 
the candidates appeared to focus on criticising their oppo-
nents rather than positively promoting their own political 
ideals. However, when compared with the 2010 campaign, 
candidates’ personal criticisms of their rivals on Twitter 
had actually decreased proportionately, with just 0.5% of 
posts passing judgement on their direct, constituency op-
ponents, and 2.7% being critical of opposition parties as 
a whole or of prominent individuals from these parties. It 
should also be noted that, while the SNP laid claim to hav-
ing run the most positive election campaign (Wade 2011), 
its candidates did, in fact, send a larger proportion of neg-
ative tweets (5.4% of SNP candidate posts) than those from 
the other major parties. These tended to be aimed at the 
Labour Party, and were accompanied by hashtags such as 
#labourfail or #labourlies. One notorious campaign epi-
sode, in which the Labour leader, Iain Gray, sought refuge 
in a sandwich shop after being confronted by a group pro-
testing against spending cuts, was the subject of many of 
the SNP candidates’ more barbed comments.
Another third (30.8%) of the overall Twitter traf-
fic consisted of what the current authors call Secondary 
Broadcast posts. This is where candidates re-tweeted oth-
ers’ comments or links (25.1% of posts), or where they pro-
vided direct links to various online political or news sites 
(5.7%). These tended to be posts that either praised the 
candidate’s party or were critical of the opposition; and 
while their origins were many and various, they were gen-
erally from local, regional and national news sources, po-
litical parties, other candidates and activists, journalists 
and political commentators, opinion pollsters, or think 
tanks.
With regard to dialogue with followers, the overall 
level of candidates’ engagement in 2011 (17.2% of total 
tweets) fell slightly from that in 2010 (18.4%); although 
the Labour Party candidates’ engagement levels dropped 
dramatically, from 36% of their tweets in 2010 to 20.3% in 
2011. Most of the interaction was based around candidates 
replying to supportive comments or pleasantries from 
family, friends and colleagues (8.3% of total tweets); while 
just over 5% of the posts involved candidates responding 
to followers’ general policy comments. Far less common 
were responses to personal attacks (0.4%) or criticisms 
of the candidates’ parties (0.7%). And while the research-
ers’ covert Twitter questions in 2011 obtained a more fa-
vourable response than twelve months earlier, overall the 
candidates appeared less responsive to questions (2.8% of 
total tweets) than in 2010 (6.3%). On this point, the SNP 
had highlighted engagement with the public as being a 
key element of its 2011 digital strategy (Macdonell 2011); 
and while there were some individuals from the party who 
regularly interacted with potential voters on Twitter (most 
notably the Deputy First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon), over-
all its candidates were proportionately the least interac-
tive of those from the major parties (see Figure 4). 
In the 2011 campaign, there was some evidence of the 
development of a Scottish version of what Jackson and 
Lilleker (2011) describe as a virtual “smoking room” – 
a Twitter community of politicians who communicate 
regularly with each other. Indeed, 3.6% of the overall 
candidate Twitter traffic was directed at other candidates; 
this compares with just a handful of posts exchanged 
between two candidates in 2010. While most of these 
tweets were sent between candidates from the same par-
ties, there were also several cross-party exchanges be-
tween rivals, which, on the whole, were friendly and well-
mannered. 
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In the 2010 UK General Election campaign, the broad-
cast of American-style, television debates, featuring sen-
ior figures from the major political parties, had a signifi-
cant impact on the extent and the nature of the traffic on 
Scottish political actors’ Twitter sites. This was particu-
larly the case with three live debates between the leaders 
of the three main UK-wide parties (i.e. excluding the SNP), 
which were the subject of almost 15% of the tweets sent 
by the parties and candidates in Scotland. Less influen-
tial in 2010 were three debates broadcast only in Scotland, 
which featured senior Scottish figures from the four main 
parties (i.e. including the SNP), and which were discussed 
in only 2.2% of the overall Twitter traffic. During the 2011 
Scottish Parliamentary campaign, another three debates 
took place, involving senior figures in Scotland. These 
were broadcast only in Scotland, in non-peak time view-
ing slots, and appeared to have a similar limited impact on 
the Scottish political Twittersphere, being the subject of 
just 3.1% of parties’ and candidates’ tweets.
As Figure 4 shows, the 2011 campaign saw significant 
growth in what the current authors describe as Unrecipro-
cated Engagement, from 9% of overall candidate tweets in 
2010, to 20.2% one year later. As had been the case in 2010, 
many of the 2011 candidates followed various well-known 
journalists, political commentators, satirical comedians, 
sportsmen and women, and other celebrities on Twit-
ter, and would sometimes respond to these individuals’ 
tweets in an apparent effort to begin a dialogue. As had 
also been the case in 2010, however, the candidates’ ef-
forts at celebrity engagement in 2011 were largely ignored. 
Interestingly, though, the 2011 campaign also saw several 
candidates attempt to engage more frequently with non-
celebrity tweeters (mostly activists and supporters of op-
posing parties) than in 2010. Their efforts suggest that 
they were monitoring Twitter traffic (including the use 
of trending hashtags) for mentions of themselves, their 
party, or of the Scottish Parliament election in general, 
and then responding to these in an effort to initiate some 
form of online conversation. Again, however, these efforts 
were largely in vain, as most of the candidates’ tweets 
were not reciprocated. A major factor here may have been 
the tone used by the candidates. For example, one Con-
Figure 4: Candidates’ Twitter post types, by party: comparison of 2010 and 2011 campaigns
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servative contestant (incidentally, the most active tweeter 
during the campaign) appeared to have adopted the tactic 
of responding in a manner designed more to irritate and 
provoke an argument rather than encourage a reasoned 
online debate:
Labour activist: “Celebrated my 1-year anniversary of Labour 
membership last night by stuffing and sorting envelopes for an 
election mailing”
Conservative candidate: “you joined just as they got kicked 
out of office for bankrupting the country? Clearly not a glory 
hunter!”
SNP activist: “Best comment overheard so far today “everbody 
[sic] I know is voting SNP because they are doing a good job” 
#bothvotesSNP #sp11”
Conservative candidate: “then you left the SNP office and got 
out on the doorsteps & met some “real” people...”
Lib Dem candidate: “So. Wet. Trying to stop the letters I’m 
delivering turning to paper mâché.”
Conservative candidate: “paper mâché is to [sic] good for 
them...”
Party Twitter Accounts
The largely one-way flow of information from politicians 
to the electorate on Twitter was even more apparent 
throughout the nine active party sites, where 83.4% of the 
1,728 tweets were broadcast-type posts, with the largest 
proportion of these (23.8%) being links to news stories and 
policy documents on the parties’ websites. Compared with 
the 2010 campaign, the parties appeared to have adopted 
a more positive tone on Twitter in 2011, with just 3.8% 
of tweets (down from 18.4% in 2010) comprising critical 
comments on their political opponents. Of the major par-
ties, the Labour Party was the most attack-minded (13.8% 
of its posts), while the Conservatives (4.3%) and the SNP 
(4.5%) had the least negative approaches. 
The parties also appeared more willing than in 2010 to 
engage with voters: in 2011, 9.9% of posts were responses 
to messages of support, questions or critical comments, 
compared with just 1.4% in 2010. The Scottish Green Par-
ty was by far the most responsive, with almost one-third 
(31.5%) of its 419 tweets contributing towards some form 
of two-way engagement, including 10.3% being answers 
to voters’ questions:
Q: “What is the GP policy on Scottish water then?”
A: “Keep it in public ownership, and enable it to invest in 
renewables on its land.”
Q: “Pls help me settle a discussion at work: Are the Scottish 
Greens seeking a referendum on independence for Scotland?”
A: “We support a constitutional convention leading to a 
referendum, yes.”
The Green Party also appeared the most likely to moni-
tor Twitter conversations and trends, with a view to at-
tempting to initiate a dialogue with the original poster(s). 
Like the candidates’ efforts described above, most were 
ignored. Indeed, one-fifth (19.6%) of the Green Party’s 
tweets, like the first example below, were Unreciprocated 
Engagement-type posts. Occasionally, though, its efforts 
were rewarded when the original poster would ‘bite’, per-
haps due to the non-confrontational tone adopted by the 
party. For example, the second attempt illustrated below 
resulted in a 20-tweet conversation on the constitutional 
issues of devolution and independence. 
Original poster: “Still trying to decide which way to vote [i.e. in 
Alternative Vote referendum]. Probably yes.... But #sp11 - still 
undecided.”
Green Party: “Time to pounce on a floating voter.. any questions 
for us?”
Original poster: “I know expecting politicos to come round to 
ask what we will do during an election is so 20th century but 
some of us appreciate it #sp11”
Green Party: “What will you do during this election? #sp11”
Candidate Facebook Sites
During the five-week campaign in 2011, the 131 candidates 
who had made their Facebook walls freely accessible post-
ed a total of 3,476 messages. Figure 5 provides a general 
overview of the nature of these messages, and compares 
them with those posted during the 2010 election. As can 
be seen, in both elections the focus was on the one-way 
broadcast of information to the electorate. In 2011, 86.5% 
of posts were broadcast-type messages (down only slight-
ly from 87.9% in 2010) and, of these, the largest propor-
tion (22.9%) were links to, or feeds from, the candidates’ 
personal websites, blogs, Twitter accounts, or other video 
or photo sharing applications, such as YouTube and yfrog. 
One-fifth (20.9%) of candidates’ posts discussed their 
personal campaign activities; down from 29.6% in 2010. 
As with the Twitter traffic, these tended to portray the typi-
cal Scottish town or village as being bathed in sunshine 
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and full of citizens eager to receive the candidate’s politi-
cal message. Again, though, the politicians were loath to 
mention what topics were being raised by voters when out 
on the campaign trail, with just 1% of posts (down from 
2.1% in 2010) covering local policy issues. And, as had 
also been the case in 2010, candidates appeared more re-
luctant to criticise their opponents on Facebook than on 
Twitter, with just 0.3% of posts discussing constituency 
rivals and 1.3% containing criticisms of nationally-known 
political figures.
Just over 13% of posts (almost twice the proportion 
than in 2010) consisted solely of photographs of candi-
dates and their teams canvassing for votes; for example, 
shaking hands, dispensing election literature, or posing 
in hard hats on construction sites. Meanwhile, one SNP 
candidate posted over 50 photographs of her campaign 
posters displayed in windows across Glasgow. Despite 
their proliferation, however, images such as these failed 
to impress the participants in the current authors’ comple-
mentary user study, where they were described as “rub-
bish” and “boring”. 
Indeed, there was some evidence to suggest that vot-
ers’ interest in actively engaging with candidates’ Face-
book sites had waned slightly since the 2010 election. Al-
though the average number of friends on these pages had 
grown marginally, from 310 to 318, the already modest av-
erage of 22.5 public posts per candidate site decreased to 
21 in 2011. And the levels of exchange and debate between 
members of the public also dropped markedly, from 19.6% 
of posts in 2010 to 10.8% one year later. Meanwhile, eight-
een of the candidates had enabled the Discussions feature 
on their Facebook sites, and had attempted to initiate de-
bate on a range of subjects, from alcohol pricing to wind 
farms. These efforts met with minimal success, with most 
(12) being ignored completely, and the others prompting 
a handful of posts at most. A typical example was that of 
one SNP candidate who urged his readers to “Tell me what 
you are thinking!”, only to be met with complete online 
silence. Interestingly, during the associated user study, 
when participants discussed online engagement between 
politicians and voters, they tended to express disappoint-
ment with the current levels of visible debate on the social 
Figure 5: Candidates’ Facebook wall post types, by party: comparison of 2010 and 2011 campaigns
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media sites of parties and candidates, yet were themselves 
reluctant to enter into any form of public dialogue with 
political actors or other voters.
As the ability to post messages on all but two Face-
book sites was restricted to confirmed friends of the can-
didates, it was unsurprising to find that over half (54%) of 
the public posts were goodwill messages from acquaint-
ances and supporters. Voters’ criticisms of candidates or 
of their parties were rare, comprising just 0.8% and 0.9% 
of the public posts respectively; although candidates did 
appear more willing to respond publicly to these than in 
2010. Interestingly, the most intense personal attacks took 
place on one of the two candidate sites with no restric-
tions on posting messages. Here, a Liberal Democrat con-
testant was the subject of several defamatory posts, from 
an individual later described by the candidate as a “full-
blown nutter”. 
And while the number of voters’ questions asked via 
the Facebook walls remained relatively small (excluding 
the researchers’ covert queries, just 95 questions were 
asked across the 131 sites), the candidates’ response rates 
to these questions did increase proportionately in 2011, 
from 36.9% to 61.7%. The answers provided, however, 
tended to be very brief and provided little evidence of any 
real desire to engage further with the enquirers. 
Party Facebook Sites
In 2011, seven of the competing parties were operating a 
Facebook site, posting a combined total of 717 messages. 
The vast majority (93.4%) of these posts saw the parties 
in one-way, broadcast mode, with 73.1% simply provid-
ing links to, or feeds from, other party and political sites. 
Although it marked an improvement from 2010, when no 
party-electorate interaction took place on Facebook, just 
6.6% of the parties’ posts consisted of some form of direct 
engagement between the site administrators and users. 
The extent to which this dialogue took place, however, 
varied between parties: public posts were ignored com-
pletely by the British National Party, the Conservatives, 
the Liberal Democrats, and Solidarity; there was only min-
imal engagement by Ban Bankers’ Bonuses and the SNP; 
while, as was the case on Twitter, the Green Party was the 
most interactive, with 13.3% of its posts being in response 
to voters’ comments and questions.
Back in 2010, just 62 public posts were made across 
the five party Facebook sites. In 2011, however, 1,356 pub-
lic posts were made across seven sites, with the majority 
(1,105) occurring on the SNP site. This is probably reflec-
tive of the vast increase in Facebook friends enjoyed by the 
party in the intervening 12 months (see Figure 1). Almost 
one-third (31.3%) of the public posts on the SNP site were 
messages of support for the party; while 15.7% discussed 
matters of national policy. Just under half (47.1%) of the 
public posts on the SNP Facebook site were exchanged 
between site users, and were often displays of political 
solidarity rather than contributions to any debate. Indeed, 
posters on the SNP site frequently adopted a rather exclu-
sivist tone, where any site user not in full support of the 
party and its policies was made to feel decidedly unwel-
come: 
“Why are you on here? You obviously don’t agree with the 
majority of people posting.”
“I take it you don’t like the SNP. Then don’t sign up to this 
forum.”
“Get off if you dont [sic] support SNP”
The SNP Facebook wall was also the home of the most 
vitriolic exchanges identified during the research, prompt-
ed in part by the presence of ‘trolls’ who appeared to have 
joined the site primarily to mischievously post critical and 
abusive comments. While the site administrators (all par-
ty officials) banned the worst culprits “for using bad lan-
guage and antagonising others who are looking to have a 
constructive dialogue”, they made little effort themselves 
to enter into any dialogue with other, seemingly genuine 
site visitors, with most policy questions and constructive 
criticisms being ignored completely.
Candidate Blogs
As mentioned above, the traffic on candidate blogs during 
the five-week campaign was relatively low, with one-third 
of the 66 bloggers failing to post at all, and the others aver-
aging only six posts each; a slight drop from seven in 2010. 
Of the total blog entries, the largest proportion (28.1%) 
consisted of candidates offering their (often detailed) 
thoughts on a range of national policy issues, from ani-
mal welfare to carbon emission targets, and from cancer 
research to policing. Almost as many posts (26.4%) dis-
cussed the candidates’ personal campaign activities, such 
as door-to-door canvassing or visiting local businesses, 
and were frequently accompanied by photographs of the 
same. Meanwhile, local issues, ranging from the lack of 
respite services in East Lothian to proposed improvements 
to the Glasgow subway system, were the subject of 13% 
of posts. Readers’ responses to these posts, however, were 
lacking, due at least in part to the fact that eight of the 
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blogs did not permit responses, and that a further three 
candidates had blocked the commenting facility on spe-
cific blog posts. Indeed, on average, each candidate blog 
post received less than one (0.3) comment, down from 0.6 
in 2010. An additional factor here may have been the fact 
that one-third of the blogs (up from one-quarter in 2010) 
contained posts that described the candidate in the third 
person, in an impersonal, press-release style perhaps less 
likely to engage the reader. Of the public’s posts, 20% 
were supportive messages, and 19.2% were criticisms of 
opposing parties and figures, giving the impression that 
most blog readers were friends and supporters of the can-
didate and their party. Criticisms were rare and, as had 
been the case in 2010, were largely ignored by the candi-
dates. Indeed, just 3.1% of the candidates’ overall posts in 
2011 were in response to readers’ comments, resulting in 
an even greater one-way flow of information from politi-
cians to the electorate than in 2010.
Comparison of Social Media Use 
by Candidates Who Stood in Both 
Elections
In making the above comparisons between candidates’ 
use of social media during the two elections, the research-
ers were mindful that, for the most part, they were dis-
cussing two discrete groups of individuals. However, 
amongst the 347 candidates standing in 2010, and the 756 
contestants in 2011, there was a significant body of 145 
individuals who competed in both campaigns. With this 
in mind, this research also paid specific attention to these 
candidates (31 Liberal Democrat, 20 Conservative, 20 SNP, 
eight Labour, and 66 from other parties), with a view to es-
tablishing if election failure in 2010 had had any obvious 
impact on the extent and nature of their social media use 
twelve months later. Figure 6 provides an overview of the 
use of social media within this group of 145 individuals 
during the two campaigns. 
Figure 6: Candidates standing in both 2010 and 2011 campaigns: comparison of social media use in each campaign
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Twenty-one candidates who had one or more forms 
of social media presence in 2010 had abandoned these by 
2011; these consisted of 11 Facebook pages, seven Twitter 
accounts and six blogs. None of these candidates had ap-
peared particularly enthusiastic users in 2010: eight had 
failed to post any messages during the campaign, while 
the frequencies of the others’ posts were generally below 
the average of the online candidates as a whole. But there 
was no evidence of these candidates having encountered 
any online abuse, or having been the subject of any con-
troversy during the 2010 election, which might have dis-
suaded them from continuing online in 2011.
In contrast, 42 candidates who had no social media 
presence in 2010, had chosen to use one or more types in 
2011, in the form of 33 Facebook pages, 11 Twitter accounts 
and six blogs. On Facebook, half (16) of the candidates 
had adopted a cautious approach, making their walls ac-
cessible only to confirmed friends. Otherwise, the patterns 
of use of these new adopters were similar to that of the 
online 2011 candidate body as a whole. 
A small core of 27 candidates had maintained one 
or more forms of social media presence throughout both 
elections, with 19 operating a Twitter account, 11 having 
a Facebook page, and eight keeping a blog. In terms of 
public access to these sites, the only significant change 
was that of one Conservative candidate (discussed above) 
moving to protect his tweets. With regard to the frequency 
of campaign posts, the picture was mixed: all eight blog-
gers reduced their posts dramatically, from an average 
of 12 down to two; the average number of Facebook wall 
posts fell from 31 to 21; while, on Twitter, half of the candi-
dates increased their traffic and the other half became less 
active. The most notable change on Twitter was that of an-
other Conservative candidate (also discussed earlier) who 
sent just 13 tweets in 2010, but over 1,400 messages twelve 
months later. Indeed, in response to a follower’s observa-
tion that the candidate’s website was lacking in currency, 
he noted, “yeah, there is a lot of stuff still from last years 
[sic] campaign. This year I’m using twitter much more - 
it’s more effective”. This perceived effectiveness had no 
obvious impact on his election performance: in 2010, he 
finished third of nine contestants with a 15% share of his 
constituency vote; while twelve months later he finished 
last of four candidates, again with a 15% share of the vote.
Amongst the group of 27 candidates using social me-
dia in both 2010 and 2011 (of whom five were eventually 
elected in 2011, four of them through the regional list sys-
tem), there were few marked differences in the nature of 
their information dissemination and exchange during the 
two campaigns. While levels of direct public engagement 
(largely in response to supportive messages) increased 
slightly in 2011, as did efforts to interact with celebrities 
and other strangers, the one-way broadcast of information 
to their ‘friends’ and followers remained the primary tac-
tic online.
Conclusions
The findings of this study suggest that, in the 2011 Scot-
tish Parliamentary election campaign, political actors in 
Scotland appeared keener to be seen using social media 
than in the UK Parliament contest the previous year, with 
52% of parties and 49% of constituency candidates having 
adopted Twitter, Facebook and/or blogs for electioneering 
purposes. Of the candidates from the four leading parties, 
however, the Conservatives remained the least willing to 
embrace these new technologies. The research also sug-
gests a shift towards Facebook as the more popular cam-
paigning tool. Yet, perhaps influenced by the previous 
negative online experiences of other political and public 
figures, fully one-third of the candidates on Facebook had 
made their walls private, accessible only to known, ap-
proved readers, rather than the wider electorate.
While the general frequency of candidates’ blog posts 
remained constant, the typical number of Facebook wall 
posts and tweets sent by politicians increased slightly 
during the 2011 campaign. The 2011 election also saw the 
online friends and followers of parties and candidates in-
crease in number, with the SNP being the main beneficiar-
ies. 
Although the traffic on, and the apparent public inter-
est in, these social media sites had risen since the 2010 
UK campaign, the nature of the information provision and 
exchange on the sites remained virtually the same. The 
majority of parties and candidates functioned largely in 
broadcast mode, with social media being used primarily 
for the one-way provision of information to voters. Two-
way interaction with the electorate was still lacking, with 
just 15.3% of the political actors’ posts being made in re-
sponse to voters’ questions, criticisms or messages of sup-
port. There was also some evidence to suggest that the 
general public’s interest in engaging with political social 
media sites was waning: with the exception of the SNP’s 
Facebook site, which saw a dramatic rise in public posts, 
the average number of public comments left on blogs and 
Facebook walls had fallen since 2010. 
The most notable difference from the 2010 campaign 
was the apparent monitoring of Twitter traffic for any ref-
erences to the Scottish Parliament election, and the politi-
cal actors’ increased attempts to engage with the original 
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senders of these tweets. As has been seen, though, these 
efforts met with minimal success, possibly due to the con-
frontational tone used by a number of the candidates and 
party officials.
Indeed, this research and the complementary user 
study have revealed the dichotomy that appears to exist 
between the online approaches of the political actors and 
the information needs of voters. For example, the par-
ticipants in the user study expressed an explicit need for 
information relating to local constituency issues, yet can-
didates’ personal policy commentary on local issues was 
lacking, or difficult to find. As had been the case twelve 
months earlier, prospective parliamentarians appeared 
more interested in discussing the weather when out on 
the campaign trail, rather than the issues being raised by 
their potential constituents. User study participants also 
expressed a wish to see regular, up-to-date posts from 
politicians during the critical campaign period, but, of the 
publicly accessible candidate sites, 16% remained dor-
mant throughout the five weeks, and a further 14% of sites 
each contained less than five campaign posts.
Perhaps in an effort to portray their ‘human side’, 
the politicians appeared anxious to share details of their 
personal and domestic lives, ranging from their musical 
tastes to their favourite cafés and restaurants. The user 
study participants, on the other hand, felt that the provi-
sion of such “trivia” was unnecessary, and preferred to 
read less inconsequential content. As one voter said, “I’m 
only interested in what he’s got to say politically. I’m not 
interested in any of that other stuff.” 
The number of photographs of campaign events and 
activities posted on parties’ and candidates’ Facebook 
walls had increased fivefold since 2010, but the user study 
participants found these decidedly uninteresting. Re-
spondents in the user study also expressed a desire to see 
more online engagement taking place between voters and 
their prospective representatives, yet, as we have seen, 
most Scottish political actors continued to avoid such in-
teraction. Indeed, it is fair to say that, overall, the partici-
pants in the user behaviour study were unimpressed with 
the campaign social media sites examined, with “puer-
ile”, “shallow” and “superficial” being amongst the terms 
used to describe the politicians’ efforts.
As had been the case with the present authors’ study 
of social media use during the 2010 UK Parliament cam-
paign (Baxter and Marcella 2012), a post-election analysis 
using the chi-square test and the phi measure of associa-
tion revealed that, statistically, there was an association 
between social media use and success in the 2011 Scot-
tish Parliamentary election. Successful constituency can-
didates were more likely (p<0.05) than unsuccessful con-
testants to have used Facebook, Twitter, or blogs during 
the campaign, although this association was relatively 
weak (φ = 0.138). Given the modest online followings of 
the majority of candidates, the significant number of dor-
mant and private pages, and the generally bland ways in 
which most contestants used social media, the current 
authors would certainly not attribute any causal relation-
ship between the two variables. Indeed, in the associated 
user study, there was very little evidence that exposure 
to campaign sites had influenced the participants’ voting 
intentions. Of the 64 respondents, one indicated that the 
Green Party’s online offerings had persuaded him to give 
the party his second, regional list vote; one 40-year-old fe-
male suggested that exploring campaign sites had kindled 
an interest in voting for the first time; while two men who 
had examined sites belonging to far-right parties each in-
dicated that this had merely reinforced their opinion that 
they would never consider voting for such parties. For the 
vast majority (60 of 64), their online sessions had had no 
effect on their likely vote. Instead, they indicated that their 
choice would be based on a long-established allegiance 
to a specific party; or that more traditional information 
sources, particularly print and broadcast media, coupled 
with long-established campaign techniques, such as leaf-
let deliveries and door knocking, would continue to play a 
more influential role.
So, what of the SNP’s assertion that its online cam-
paign had “swayed the vote”? While it is acknowledged 
that certain elements of the SNP’s digital strategy, such 
as its voter database, will have played a crucial role in in-
forming and organising the party’s activists during what 
was an unprecedented election victory, the current au-
thors would question the impact of the public face of the 
SNP’s online campaign, more specifically the party’s and 
candidates’ social media sites. While the SNP and its can-
didates may have had the greatest online presence, and 
the largest followings, the nature of its information con-
tent and communication was little different from those of 
the other parties. Indeed, while the SNP put great stock 
in the positivity of its online campaign (Wade 2011), this 
study has found that its candidates were, in fact, the most 
attack-minded of those from the main parties, and that the 
party’s Facebook site was peppered with the most venom-
ous online exchanges. And while the SNP also emphasised 
how “amazingly powerful” the act of interacting with 
voters online can be (Macdonell 2011), this research has 
established that its candidates were the least interactive 
of those from the major parties, and that there was only 
minimal engagement with voters on the party’s Facebook 
and Twitter sites. Bearing these points in mind, and in line 
with other observers (e.g., Barnes 2011; Taylor 2011), the 
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current authors would argue that a range of other factors 
were probably far more influential in the SNP’s electoral 
success, including: the perceived charisma of the party’s 
leader, Alex Salmond; a misplaced, and often inept, La-
bour Party campaign; and the collapse of the Liberal Dem-
ocrat vote, because of its coalition with the Conservative 
Party at the UK Government level. The first true Internet 
election in the UK, we believe, has yet to materialise.
And what are the implications of these findings for 
those candidates who were successfully elected to the 
Scottish Parliament? When the Parliament was being es-
tablished in the late 1990s, an Expert Panel on Informa-
tion and Communications Technologies (1998) recom-
mended that it should focus upon how new and emerging 
technologies might assist democratic participation, and 
the contribution that they could make in enabling greater 
openness and accessibility. The Panel believed that the 
Scottish Parliament should “aspire to be an example of 
best practice in parliamentary information systems.” 
Since then, according to Smith and Webster (2008), new 
information and communications technologies (ICTs) 
“have become a cultural norm of contemporary parlia-
mentary life” in the Scottish Parliamentary setting, where 
MSPs and their assistants use them constantly in order to 
fulfil their legislative, oversight and representative roles. 
Smith and Webster found, for example, that the majority 
of MSPs regard ICTs as essential or very useful in carrying 
out activities central to their parliamentary activity, such 
as when ‘researching specific issues’ (be that when using 
the services of the parliamentary library, the Scottish Par-
liament Information Centre, or other unofficial sources), 
‘making policy statements’, ‘representing constituents’, 
‘distributing political information’ and ‘participating in 
debates’. Smith and Webster’s study took place in 2006, 
before the emergence of Facebook and Twitter, but the po-
tential value of such social media as information provision 
and communication tools has since become recognised 
within the Scottish Parliament, where it is acknowledged 
that they offer “an increased flexibility in the ways MSPs 
can communicate about their role, to an essentially un-
limited (and international) audience”, and “can increase 
the accessibility of MSPs and offer new ways in which to 
engage constituents, stakeholders and the wider public” 
(Scottish Parliament Standards, Procedures and Public 
Appointments Committee 2012). However, as this elec-
tion campaign study has revealed, those seeking election 
to the Scottish Parliament largely failed to provide policy 
information, or engage with potential constituents, via 
their social media accounts, or made much of their online 
content publicly inaccessible. With these points in mind, 
the current authors would suggest that many of the suc-
cessful candidates will have to significantly modify their 
information provision and communication practices on 
entering parliament if they are to become fully and effec-
tively integrated into this community of modern, online 
parliamentarians.
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